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Abstract
We describe an eﬀective device-based isolation approach for achieving data security. We show its use in protecting the
secrecy of highly sensitive data that is crucial to security operations, such as cryptographic keys used for decrypting
ciphertext or signing digital signatures. Private key is usually encrypted in its storage when not used; however, when
being used, the plaintext key is loaded into the memory of the host for access. We present a novel and practical solution
and its prototype called DataGuard to protect the secrecy of the highly sensitive data through the storage isolation and
secure tunneling enabled by a mobile handheld device. DataGuard can be deployed for the key protection of individuals
or organizations. We implement three prototypes and conduct extensive experiments to evaluate the feasibility and
performance of DataGuard. The results show that our approach performs well without signiﬁcant overhead.
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1. Introduction
In the seminal work on computer virus [1], Cohen described isolationism as a potential prevention
against the propagation of viruses (on multi-user computers), which refers to no dissemination and no shar-
ing of information across information boundaries. However, absolute isolation clearly would signiﬁcantly
hinder the usefulness of the computing environment. Yet, partial isolation can be strategically implemented
to realize speciﬁc security goals. For example, Borders et al. proposed a solution for achieving data conﬁ-
dentiality that requires disconnection from the network when the data is being accessed [2].
We describe a practical and powerful device-based isolation approach for information security and
demonstrate its application in preserving the conﬁdentiality of cryptographic keys. The conﬁdentiality of
cryptographic keys is the security foundation of virtually all cryptographic/security protocols, and is es-
sential for individuals and organizations including certiﬁcate authorities (e.g., Symantec). Device-based
isolation is deﬁned by us as isolating the storage and operations related to data with diﬀerent security re-
quirements (e.g., conﬁdentiality requirement) through multiple computing devices. In addition, the isolation
should not hinder the use and access of the data for practical applications.
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The novelty of our work is the design and demonstration of how inexpensive and pervasive personal
computing devices can be specialized and used for security. We point out that the device isolation and
function specialization enable the achievement of high data assurance in applications. These new designs
are feasible and practical and beneﬁt from the recent ubiquitous computing reality.
In a strong adversary model, the host and its kernel may be compromised by attackers or malicious
software, and thus the conﬁdentiality of the host memory – including cryptographic keys stored there –
cannot be guaranteed. For example, simply storing the plaintext private key on a removable medium (eg.,
a regular USB drive) is not a complete solution because the key still needs to be loaded to the host for use.
For this reason, the cryptographic (private) key is usually encrypted on external storage when it is not being
used. When needed, the encrypted key is decrypted (which typically requires the user to enter a passphrase).
The plaintext key is then loaded into the memory of the host for access.
A number of techniques have been developed to preserve the conﬁdentiality of cryptographic keys.
Using a tamper-resistant smart card for the key storage requires a special reader, which may not be available.
In a more complex solution, the host may be equipped with an on-chip trusted platform module (TPM) that
allows the host to attest its system integrity to a trusted server when the plaintext key is loaded; the encrypted
private key can only be decrypted when the host’s system integrity is veriﬁed. However, one major limitation
of this approach is that TPM cannot prevent any run-time compromise taking place after the attestation [3].
Thus, the keys may be exposed. In general, the fundamental and practical security problem of protecting
the secrecy of the private key is not adequately addressed in the security literature.
In this paper, we present a novel and practical technique to enhance the conﬁdentiality of private keys.
Our design separates private keys from an untrusted host to a special-purpose, trusted handheld device,
while still enabling the host to use the key (e.g., for decryption and signing). Our approach recognizes
that ensuring system integrity – the assurance that applications and the host’s operating system including
the kernel have not been compromised by attackers or malicious software – of a general-purpose computer
with Internet connectivity is diﬃcult in general. However, a dedicated special-purpose computing device is
relatively easier to secure and less susceptible to attacks. Such a device may be an inexpensive smartphone
or tablet computer. We use a trusted device for dedicated key storage and cryptographic operations, which
allows the key to be used without being exposed to the untrusted host. Accordingly, our solution can be
easily deployed by any entities (individuals or organizations) using the public key cryptosystems to enhance
their protection of private keys.
Our device-based isolation framework – named DataGuard – provides two security functions: i) it pro-
tects highly sensitive cryptographic keys by isolating them from the untrusted general computing environ-
ment, and ii) it supports the secure use of the key through a protocol by which the host may request a
message to be signed with the protected private key. Without our device-based isolation of secret keys, the
cleartext key value would exist in the memory of the host when it is being used, and thus a compromised host
may lead to key compromise. In our prototypes, we show several independent instantiations of DataGuard
with various types of machines, including a smartphone, a tablet computer, and a Linux box for embedded
system. More details can be found in our technical report [4].
2. Design Overview
2.1. DataGuard Architecture
Our device-based isolation design consists of two main components: i) a host running a DataGuard
daemon, and ii) an external trusted device running a DataGuard application, which are described as follows.
1. Host is a personal computer which is vulnerable to malware attacks. However, the host’s owner needs
to utilize the private cryptographic keys to decrypt ciphertext or sign messages. Hence, we need to
provide the security enhancement to this host by protecting the secret keys from being compromised.
DataGuard daemon is a software application used to connect the host with the external trusted
device. It initiates a communication channel with the trusted device and uses this channel to execute
the commands requested from the DataGuard application running on the trusted device.
2. External trusted device is an external device used to enhance the data security of the host by storing
the cryptographic secret keys of the host and performing the cryptographic operations. DataGuard
1132   Karim O. Elish et al. /  Procedia Computer Science  19 ( 2013 )  1130 – 1135 
is deployed on this device. The selection of the trusted device should support the following criteria
in order to be used in our framework: i) it should have the capability to perform computation, ii) it
should have storage space, iii) it should have the ability to communicate with other devices, and v) it
should have I/O capability with a display screen.
Any device that possesses these characteristics can be used as a trusted device in our framework.
DataGuard application is a software application running on the external trusted device. It is used
to communicate with the host and performs the security-related cryptographic operations (namely
decryption and signing) which are described in details in Section 4.
2.2. Security Goals, Threat Model, and Assumptions
• Security goals: The primary goal of our framework is to enhance the data conﬁdentiality of a host
by protecting its sensitive data from being compromised by malicious attacks. In particular, our
security goals are three-fold: i) to ensure the conﬁdentiality of cryptographic private keys, ii) to ensure
the conﬁdentiality of ciphertext being decrypted, and iii) to ensure the integrity of digital signature
produced.
• Threat model and security assumptions: In our threat model, we assume that the host including
the user-space and kernel-space data and code are not secure and vulnerable to malicious attacks.
Speciﬁcally, the attacker may attempt to: i) gain knowledge of a private key, ii) gain knowledge of
the message encrypted with the corresponding public key, and iii) forge digital signatures on behalf
of the legitimate key owner.
We assume that the external device’s data and code are trusted and not compromised. This assumption
is reasonable, as the device can be a special-purpose computing device with no or limited network
connectivity and limited permitted operations.
A general purpose computer may be vulnerable to malicious attacks as it is typically connected to the
Internet. DataGuard provides a secure communication channel between the external device and the host. In
this case, the external device is more isolated and easier to secure compared to the conventional approach.
The external device is not exposed directly to the Internet. We refer to the external device as a trusted device.
The external device is easier to secure compared to a general purpose computer because of two reasons as
follows: i) it only securely communicates to the host, and ii) it only provides one speciﬁc key usage service,
its data and code are small as a result of limited operations.
Therefore, our assumption on the integrity of the trusted device is practical. The storage and usage
environments of the cryptographic keys that we aim to protect are isolated from the general computing
environment. This property is achieved because the keys are stored and operated on the trusted device, and
never appear on general purpose computers (i.e., the host).
3. Protocols for Accessing Private Keys
In a device-based isolation architecture, cryptographic private keys are stored on a trusted dedicated
device, as opposed to a general-purpose networked computer (i.e., host), for the conﬁdentiality of the key.
In order to use the key for decryption or signing, the host needs a protocol to utilize the private key without
learning the key value. In this section, we describe two protocols for using private keys in our DataGuard
framework: i) decrypting the ciphertext received by the host, and ii) signing an outgoing message.
Secure decryption protocol. This protocol allows the DataGuard user (Alice) to decrypt the ciphertext
received from the Internet. The sender of the message (e.g., Bob) encrypts a secret message using Alice’s
public key and then sends it to Alice. Alice’s host receives the encrypted message and sends it to the trusted
device for decryption using the private key stored in the trusted device. Then, the decrypted/original message
is displayed on the screen of the trusted device to ensure the conﬁdentiality of the original message. Figure 1
depicts the secure decryption protocol in DataGuard. The detailed operations are as follows:
1. Alice’s host receives the ciphertext C from Bob who encrypts the message M with the public key of
Alice to ensure the conﬁdentiality of M.
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Fig. 1. Secure decryption procedure in DataGuard. Red key is the private key of the DataGuard user.
2. The DataGuard daemon on Alice’s host initiates a request for connecting to the trusted device.
3. The trusted device provides a PIN/passkey to verify its identity before connecting to Alice’s host.
Upon the veriﬁcation, the trusted device is paired with Alice’s host and the connection is established.
4. Alice’s host forwards ciphertext C to the secure decryption application running on the trusted device.
5. The secure decryption application receives C, and decrypts C with Alice’s private key K stored in the
trusted device to obtain the message M. Alice may need to enter her passphrase on the trusted device
in order to decrypt the private key.
6. Message M is displayed on the screen of the trusted device.
One application of this secure decryption protocol mechanism is secure email, i.e., decrypting encrypted
email messages. To protect the email conﬁdentiality usually the sender and receiver use end-to-end email
encryption tool like openPGP. Our solution can also be used to protect email conﬁdentiality. For example,
the DataGuard user receives an encrypted email. The host relays the encrypted email to the trusted device.
The trusted device performs the decryption and displays the plaintext message on its screen. In addition, the
sender can use our approach to encrypt the email message before sending it. Thus, our solution can protect
email conﬁdentiality even if the attacker controls the host/computer or has access to the mail server.
Secure signing protocol. In this protocol, Alice uses her external trusted device to digitally sign a
message. Whenever Alice needs to send a signed message to Bob, the message is forwarded to the trusted
device for signing before Alice sends the message to Bob. The detailed operations of secure signing protocol
can be found in [4]. One application of the secure signing protocol is electronic purchasing where a customer
sends a signed purchase order to a vendor.
4. Implementation and Evaluation
DataGuard architecture requires the establishment of a secure channel between the host and the trusted
device. Therefore, we implemented and supported two types of communication methods: i) wired using
universal serial bus (USB) and ii) wireless using Bluetooth. For Bluetooth communication in our prototype,
we chose BlueZ which is the Linux Bluetooth Protocol Stack.
We developed two Android-based applications to support the security protocols presented in this paper,
namely i) a secure decryption application which performs the secure decryption service and ii) a secure
signing application which performs the digital signing service. We support diﬀerent algorithms (RSA and
AES) with diﬀerent key lengths for decryption, and DSA and RSA with diﬀerent key lengths for signing.
We developed two Chrome extensions, namely a secure decryption extension and a secure digital signing
extension, to demonstrate the practicality of our approach. Due to the space limitation, the implementation
details of DataGuard framework can be found in [4].
We conducted several experiments to evaluate the eﬃciency of our DataGuard prototypes, including the
running time of cryptographic operations on the trusted device. We used a Lenovo T410 laptop as a host
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Fig. 2. Decryption performance of AES and RSA on handheld devices.
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Fig. 3. Digital signing performance of RSA and DSA on handheld devices.
which has 2.40GHz dual core Intel Core i5 processors, 2GB memory, a Bluetooth chipset compatible with
Bluetooth 2.1 speciﬁcation, and Ubuntu 10.04 LTS. We realized our prototype and evaluations on three dif-
ferent trusted handheld devices: a Linux box device (ADVANTECH Linux Box-PC ARK-1360) designed
for embedded systems, Android Development Phone (ADP), and Samsung Galaxy Tab 10.1. Android De-
velopment Phone (ADP) is a smartphone that runs Google Android OS 2.1 and has a 576MHz processor
with 512MB ROM, 288MB RAM, and Bluetooth 2.0. Samsung Galaxy Tab 10.1 is a tablet computer that
runs Google Android OS 3.1 and has a dual-core 1GHz processor, 32GB ROM, 1GB RAM, and Bluetooth
2.1. All of them meet the requirements for the trusted device described in Section 2.1.
For completeness, we implemented and evaluated all relevant operations of both public-key and symmetric-
key schemes in DataGuard, including encryption/decryption and signing/veriﬁcation. Figure 2 shows the
decryption performance of diﬀerent ciphertext sizes on two handheld devices by using AES (128-bit, 192-
bit and 256-bit keys) and RSA (512-bit, 1024-bit, and 2048-bit keys), respectively. Figure 3 shows the
signing performance on two handheld devices by using DSA (512-bit, 1024-bit) keys and RSA (512-bit,
1024-bit, 2048-bit) keys, respectively. Our experimental results show feasible performance of DataGuard
as all cryptographic operations can be performed eﬃciently on the external trusted handheld devices with-
out signiﬁcant overhead, and the communication bandwidth of Bluetooth is suﬃcient for transmitting large
amounts of data (e.g., ciphertext or digital signature) in a timely fashion. More evaluation results can be
found in [4].
Security analysis. Key conﬁdentiality. Our framework provides secure storage for cryptographic private
keys by isolating and storing them on a dedicated trusted device instead of keeping them on the untrusted
host. All cryptographic operations involving the private keys take place in the external trusted device as
well. Therefore, the values of private keys are not revealed to the host and the conﬁdentiality of private
keys is preserved. Message conﬁdentiality. The conﬁdentiality of the message is preserved because the
decryption is performed and displayed on the trusted device. The host only has the access to the ciphertext.
Message integrity. The integrity of the message can be preserved and signature cannot be forged, as the
digital signature can only be generated by the trusted device uniquely possessing the private key. Due to the
space limitation, the detailed discussion on security analysis of DataGuard can be found in [4].
5. Related Work
McCune et al. [5] proposed a framework called Bump in the Ether (BitE) to ensure the integrity of
sensitive user input to the applications running on the host. In [6], the authors introduced a Bumpy system
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that protects the sensitive user input for web applications by processing the input in an isolated code module
on the user’s system, where they can be processed for a remote webserver. BitE and Bumpy systems address
the integrity of user input to the applications, while our work addresses the conﬁdentiality requirement of
secret data (cryptographic keys) used in sensitive operations (decryption and signing). Storage Capsules
system is a recent approach introduced by Borders et al. [2] to protect conﬁdential ﬁles on a personal
computer. It allows a compromised host to securely view and edit sensitive ﬁles by isolating the primary
operating system in a virtual machine and disabling network and other device output before it is accessing
conﬁdential ﬁles. Our work uses a separate device for isolation to achieve the data conﬁdentiality, while
Storage Capsule performs the isolation on the same machine. Zic and Nepal [7] designed and implemented
a prototype personal trusted device called the Trust Extension Device (TED) that provides users with a
portable trustworthy environment for performing transactions on computer which is connected to Internet.
Also, Nepal et al. [8] designed and built a mobile and portable Trusted Computing Platform (TCP) based on
Trusted Computing Group (TCG) speciﬁcation. Their solution provides a TCP on a USB device to enable
the mobility and portability of trust for enterprise applications. The solutions in [7] and [8] do not provide a
complete isolation from untrusted host as their proposed device does not have any input/output devices on its
own, instead it relies on the input/output devices of the untrusted host machine. Some other solutions have
used mobile handheld devices to provide secure authentication techniques [9, 10], provide secure remote
access to the user’s home computing environment [11], propose a realistic mobile ticket system [12], and
enhance web browsing security on public terminals [13].
6. Conclusions and Future Work
With the proliferation of personal handheld computing devices, such as smartphones and tablet com-
puters, we proposed a device-based isolation approach and its prototype called DataGuard to protect the
secrecy of the highly sensitive data (namely cryptographic keys) through the storage isolation and secure
tunneling. Our solution does not require highly specialized (system-speciﬁc) services and hence it would be
easily ported to other platforms. We conducted extensive experiments to evaluate the feasibility and perfor-
mance of DataGuard. The results show that our approach performs well without signiﬁcant overhead. For
future work, we plan to perform more systematic studies to evaluate the usability of our approach to ﬁnd out
users’ experiences in using an external device to store secret keys and perform cryptographic operations.
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